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[So F. No. 19580. In Bank. Jan. 17, 1958.]

Guardianship of the Persons and Estates of DONALD
BRUCE HENWOOD et a!., Minors. MARY G. ALEXANDER, Appellant, V. GEORGE DONALD HENWOOD
et a!., Respondents.

')

[1] Guardian and Ward-Custod1: Adoption-Relinquishment to
Adoption Agenc1-Custod1.-Prob. Code, §§ 1400,1405, 1406,
1440, 1500, 1512 (relating to guardians, their appointment,
powers and duties), and Civ. Code, § 224n (relating to duties
and rights of adoption agencies), cannot operate to control
the custody of the same child at the same time; a child canDot be in the custody of a guardian subject to court control
and at the same time be in the custody and control of an adoption agency; the right to custody must rest with one custodian
or the other since no machinery is provided whereby it ma1
be divided between them.
[2] Id.-Oustod1: Adoption-lLe1inquishment to Adoption Agency
-Custod1.-In the absence of an express provision depriving
the court of power to appoint a guardian of a child that has
been validly relinquished for adoption, the adoption statutes
may not reasonably be interpreted as depriving such child of
the protection afforded by guardianship proceedings in a
proper ease.

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Adoption of Children, § 12; Guardian and
Ward, §§ 61,72.
!rIcK. Dig. References: [1-4] Guardian and Ward, § 54; Adoption, § 21; 15, 8, 9] Guardian lind Ward, § 9; Adoption, § 21; [6]
Adoption, § 1; [7] Adoption, § 5; [10] Guardian and Ward, § 9.
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[8] lcl.--Oustody: Adoption-Relinquishment to Adoption Alency.
-Ouatody.-It cannot be assumed that adoption agencies will
necessarily in all cases have such wisdom and competence that
they may be set apart ·from other custodians and given ca,'e
blanche in their control of relinquished children until a petition for adoption is before the court j the Legislature would
not leave such curtailment of the court's power to be drawn
by inference alone from adoption provisions that contain no
reference to guardianship proceedings.
[4] ld.-Cuatody: Adoption-Relinquishment to Adoption Alency
-Oustody.-A child is not a party to an agreement for his relinquishment to an adoption agency, but it is his interest that
the court must protect in passing on a petition for adoption
or for appointment of a guardian.
[6] ld.-Appointment of Guardian: Adoption-Relinquishment to
Adoption Agency.-The court may not ignore the adoption
procedures and supersede them by appointment of a guardian
on a ground that, absent relinquishment to a licensed agency,
might support the conclusion that the appointment of a guard- .
ian was necessary or convenient; the statutory provisions can
be reconciled and eBect given to both statutory schemes for
protecting the welfare of the child only if the requirement
of necessity or convenience for the appointment of a guardian
is interpreted in the light of the agency adoption provisions
in the case of relinquished children.
[6) Adoption-Judicial Attitude.-Adoption of children is ordinarily preferred to guardianship.
[7] 1d.-OoDStruction of 8tatutes.-Whenever possible, such •
construction should be given adoption laws as will sustain,
rather than defeat, the object they have in new.
[8] Guardian and Ward-Appointment of Guardian: AdoptionBelinquishment to Adoption Agency.-The statutes governing
the adoption of relinquished children express by clear implication a legislative determination that the appointment of a
guardian is not necessary or convenient while the adoption procedure is running its proper course; in the absence of a showing that the adoption agency is unfit to have temporary custody
of the child or that it is improbable that the child will be
adopted, the appointment of a guardian is neither necessary
Dor convenient, but if the agency is shown to be unfit, the
child's immediate welfare demands intervention, and if it is
shown that adoption is improbable, continued waiting-room·
custody by the agency can DO longer be justified as promotive
of adoption, and the guardianship of a willing relative may
better serve the best interests of the child.
[7] See Cal..Tur.2d, Adoption of Children, § 4; Am...Tur•• Adoption
of Children, 15 et seq.
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[9] Id.-Appolntment of Guardian: Adoption-Belinlluisbment to
Adoption Ageney.-Ordinarily, it may be assumed that the
natural parents and an a30ption agency have the oompetence
to decide that adoption is preferable to guardianship, but
sucb decision must be approved by the court before adoption
can take place and may be challenged in guardianship proceedings if it appears that it is improbable that adoption will
occur.
[10] Id.-Appolntment of Guardian.-Where the trial court'. ruling dismissing a maternal grandmother's petition for guardianship of two minor children was based on the erroneous view
that it had no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian after a valid
relinquishment to an adoption agency had been made, the
grandmother should be afforded opportunity to make a showing
of necessity or convenience.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Alameda County dismissing a petition for the appointment of a
guardian of the persons of two minor children. Marvin Sherwin, JUdge. Reversed.
Fred B. Mellmann and Russell P. Studebaker for Appellant.
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J. F. Coakley, District Attorney (Alameda), R. Robert
Hunter, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Richard J. Moore,
Deputy District Attorney, and Raymond N. Baker, for Respondents.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Richard L.
Mayers, Deputy Attorney General, as Amici Curiae, on behalf
of Respondents.
TRA YNOR, J .-In June, 1955, the mother of Donald Bruce
Henwood and Joel Arthur Henwood died. In July, 1955,
their father relinquished them for adoption to the Alameda
County Welfare Commission, a '"licensed adoption agency.
In October, 1955, their maternal grandmother, Mary G.
Alexander, petitioned to be appointed their guardian. At
that time the children were 8 and 5 years of age. The trial
court found that Mrs. Alexander, aged 63, was a fit person
to have the custody of the children and that their father had
placed them for adoption believing that "it would be in the
best interests of sai'd minors that they be adopted by parents
selected by the Commission, in order that they might have
tI C.Id-ll
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the benetit of a normal parental relationship." It con- ,' ..
eluded that "by reason of the relinquishment of said minors
and the fact that they are in the care, custody and control
of a licensed County adoption agency, as a matter of law, this
court is precluded from determining that it is either necessary
or convenient that a guardian be appointed for either of said
minors under the provisions of Sections 1405 and 1440 of the
Probate Code." Mrs. Alexander appeals.
She contends that the provisions of the Civil Code with
respect to adoptions do not affect the court's jurisdiction to
appoint a guardian and that therefore the court erred in
refusing to determine whether the best interests of the children established the necessity or convenience of her appointment and in dismissing her petition. Respondents contend,
on the other hand, that by establishing a comprehensive scheme
for the placement of children for adoption through licensed
adoption agencies, the Legislature has necessarily precluded
the appointment of a guardian once a child has been validly
relinquished to an adoption agency.
Sections 1405 and 1440 of the Probate Code provide for
the appointment of a guardian when necessary or convenient.
The court is to be guided by "what appears to be for the best
interest of the child in respect to its temporal and mental and
moral welfare" (Prob. Code, § 1406), and the guardian has
the care and custody of the ward (Prob. Code, § 1500) subject
to the regulation and control of the court. (Prob. Code,
§§ 1400,1512).
Section 224n of the Civil Code provides: "The agency
to which a child has been relinquished for adoption shall be
responsible for the care of the child, and shall be entitled
to the custody and control of the child at all times until a
petition for adoption has been granted. Any placement for
temporary care, or for adoption made by the agency, may be
terminated at the discretion of the agency at any time prior
to the granting of a petition for adoption. In the event of
termination of any placement for temporary care or for
adoption, the child shall be returned promptly to the physical
custody of the agency.
"No petition may be tiled to adopt a child relinquished
to a licensed adoption agency except by the prospective
adoptive parents with whom the child has been placed for
adoption by the adoption agency. After the petition for
adoption has been tiled, the agency may remove the child from
the prospective adoptive parents only with the approval of

Jan. 1958]
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the court, upon motion by the agency after notice to the
prospective adoptive parents, supported by an affidavit or
affidavits stating the grouD(\s on which removal is sought.·
If an agency refuses to consent to the adoption of a child
by the person or persons with whom the agency placed the
child for adoption, the superior court may nevertheless decree
the adoption if it finds that the refusal to consent is not in
the best interest of the child."
[1] It is apparent from the foregoing statutes that the
adoption provisions and the guardianship provisions cannot
operate to control the custody of the same child at the same
time. A child cannot be in the custody of a guardian subject
to the control of the court and at the same time be in the
custody and control of the agency. In any given case the
right to custody must rest with one custodian or the other
for no machinery is provided whereby it may be divided between them. Neither in the statutes with respect to guardianship nor in those with respect to adoption, however, has the
Legislature expressly provided which should prevail.
Mrs. Alexander contends that the guardianship provisions
must necessarily be considered paramount, for otherwise no
court would be available to the child to protect its interests
during the period between relinquishment and the filing of a
petition for adoption. She points out that even natural
parents are not given such immunity from judicial control
and contends that adoption agencies should likewise be subject to judicial supervision at all times. Moreover, she contends that the crucial decision to relinquish the child for
adoption should be subject to review to determine whether
in a given case guardianship rather than adoption will serve
the best interests of the child. If review of this determination
must be postponed until the court is called upon to approve
or disapprove a petition for adoption, an event that may
never occur, the child may be permanently deprived of the
. benefits of the care and custody of a guardian that its welfare
.
demands.
R.espondents contend, however, that adoption is preferred
to guardianship (see 111 re Santos, 185 Cal. 127, 130 [195 P.
1055]), that the legislative scheme is designed to secure to
children the benefits of adoption, that to permit the court
to interfere with that scheme by appointing a guardian would
subvert its purpos,e, and that the child's interest is adequately
-ThiB lentenlle was added in 1957.
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protected by the exercise of the parent's and agency's judg.
ment that adoption is desirable and by the court review
provided before adoption can b.ke place.
[2] In the absence of an express provision d.epriving the
court of power to appoint a guardian of a child that has
been validly relinquished for adoption, we do not believe
that the adoption statutes may reasonably be interpreted as
depriving such a child of the protection afforded by guardian·
ship proceedings in a proper case. "Throughout custody
law runs the thread of the interest of the state in the welfare
of its children. It is this sovereign interest that functions
like a protective arm to keep open the doors of the court to
preserve, to control, and to modify the child's status in
relation to its elders." (Lennard, Enforcement and Modifica·
tum of Child Custody Awards, Family Law for California
LawYers 759.) [3] We cannot assume that adoption agencies
will necessarily in all cases have such wisdom and competence
that they may be set apart from other custodians and given
carte blanche in their control of relinquished children until
a petition for adoption is before the court. Certainly, the
Legislature would not leave such a curtailment of the court's
power to be drawn by inference alone from adoption pro·
visions that contain no reference to guardianship proceedings.
Moreover, in this respect, the provisions of Civil Code, section
224m, making the relinquishment binding on the parents and
the agency add nothing to those of section 224n giving the
agency responsibility for the care, custody and control of
the child. [4] The child is not a party to the relinquishment
agreement, but it is his interest that the court must protect
in passing on a petition for adoption or for the appointment
of a guardian. (See Adoption of McDonald, 43 Ca1.2d 447,
461 [274 P.2d 860].)
[6] Our conclusion that the adoption statutes do not
preclude the appointment of a guardian for a validly reo
linquished child does not mean that the court may ignore
the adoption procedures and supersede them by the appoint.
ment of a guardian on grounds that, absent relinquishment
to a licensed agency, might support the conclusion that the
appointment of a guardian was necessary or convenient.
(Cf. Guardianship of Minviear, 141 Ca1.App.2d 703. 707
[297 P.2d 105].) The statutory provisions can be reconciled
and eif('ct given to both statutory schcmes for protecting
the welfare of the child only if the requirement of neces·
sity or convenience for the appointment of a guardian is

)
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interpreted in the light of the agency adoption provisions in
the case of relinquished children. Only in this way is it possible not only to prevent abuses of the adoption procedure
but also to protect that proce<\ure from interference when it
is functioning properly. [6] As stated above, adoption is
ordinarily to be preferred to guardianship. [7] "Whenever
possible, such a construction should be given adoption laws as
will sustain, rather than defeat, the object they have in view.
[Citation.] The main purpose of adoption statutes is the
promotion of the welfare of children, bereft of the benefits of
the home and care of their real parents, by the legal recognition and regulation of the consummation of the closest conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and child.
While a guardian of the person of a minor is charged with a
high duty and serious responsibility in the care of his ward,
nevertheless the status of guardian and ward falls short of
the close approximation to the relationship of parent and
child which is attainable through actual adoption culminating,
as it does, in the child becoming a member, to all intents and
purposes, of the family of the foster parents." (In re Santos,
supra, 185 Cal. 127, 130.) [8] The Legislature has adopted
a comprehensive plan for the adoption of relinquisbed children
and has provided that a valid relinquishment is binding on
the natural parent or parent.s and that no person other than
prospective adoptive parents selected by the agency may
petition for adoption. This procedure would obviously be
frlMtrated, if at any time the court could determine in the
exercise of its independent judgment and discretion that 8
guardian should be appointed and custody removed from the
agency or prospective adoptive parents selected by it. The
prohibition against the filing of a petition for adoption by a
stranger could in effect be circumvented and the agency's
primary responsibility to select a custodian and prospective
adoptive parents nullified. In the light of these considerations,
we conclude that the statutes· governing the adoption of relinquished children express by clear implication a legislative
determination that the appointment of a guardian is not
necessary or convenient while the adoption procedure is running its proper course. Accordingly, in the absence of a
showing that the agency is unfit to have the temporary custody
of the child or that it is improbable that the child will be
adopted, the appointment of a guardian is neither necessary
nor convenient.. On the other hand, if the agency is shown
to be unfit, the child's immediate welfare demands interven-
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tion, and if it is shown that adoption is improbable, continued
waiting-room custody by the agency can no longer be justified
as promotive of adoption, and the guardianship of a willing
relative may well better serve the best interests of the child.
[9] Ordinarily, it may be assumed that the natural parents
and the agency have the competence to decide that adoption
is preferable to guardianship. This decision, however, must
be approved by the court before adoption can take place and
may be challenged in guardianship proceedings if it appears
that it is improbable that adoption will occur. It is true that
in the interim changes affecting the child may take place, but
the risk of harm therefrom is materially less than the risk
of harm that would flow from permitting every adoption
proceeding to be halted midstream for a judicial determination
of whether guardianship might be preferable. The legislative
choice between these risks is both apparent and reasonable.
[10] Although no showing was made in the present case
that the agency was unfit to have temporary custody of the
children or that adoption was improbable, the trial court's
ruling was based on the erroneous view that it had no jurisdiction in any case to appoint a guardian after a valid relinquishment had been made. Under these circumstances Mrs.
Alexander should be afforded the opportunity to make a
showing of necessity or convenience as herein defined.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Spence, J., and McComb,
J., concurred.
Schauer, J., eoncurred in the judgment.
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